- US Representatives Tlaib, Jayapal and Pressley, alongside Senators Markey and Merkley, reintroduced the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act on September 25, 2026, which would prohibit federal acquisition of biometric surveillance systems and condition federal grants to states on enacting matching bans.
- The ACLU filed two wrongful arrest suits in 2026, in Florida in June and Maryland in April, both stemming from incorrect facial recognition matches, concrete cases the bill’s sponsors are using to press for federal action against a technology the December 2019 NIST study found produces false positives for Asian and African American faces at rates 10 to 100 times higher than for Caucasian faces.
Two wrongful arrest suits in a single year, both filed by the ACLU and both traceable to incorrect facial recognition matches, are now the sharpest evidence behind a federal push to ban the technology outright. On September 25, 2026, Representatives Rashida Tlaib, Pramila Jayapal and Ayanna Pressley, joined by Senators Edward J. Markey and Jeff Merkley, reintroduced the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act, a bill that would cut off federal grant funding to any state or local government that fails to impose a matching prohibition.
The Accuracy Problem
The bill’s sponsors point to a December 2019 NIST study as the evidentiary foundation. For one-to-one matching, the study found false positive rates for Asian and African American faces were 10 to 100 times higher than for Caucasian faces, depending on the algorithm. The ACLU suits filed in Florida in June 2026 and Maryland in April 2026 translate that disparity into its human cost: two people arrested for crimes they did not commit, in two different states, within the same calendar year.
Federal Deployment Keeps Expanding
A May 2026 Congressional Research Service report documented accelerating federal deployment of facial recognition with no comprehensive regulatory framework in place. Customs and Border Protection is extending facial recognition to all non-US citizen travelers at air, land and sea ports of entry throughout 2026, while Immigration and Customs Enforcement has gained access to new identification tools for deportation operations. In September 2026, the ACLU warned that aggregating biometric data into searchable databases, including by private companies, creates a surveillance infrastructure capable of tracking movements and associations without consent or a warrant. The CRS report reinforced the concern, noting the absence of any statutory guardrails on how collected data is stored or shared.
Cities Have Moved First
San Francisco became the first major US city to ban government use of facial recognition in 2019. Somerville and Oakland followed quickly. Portland went further in 2020, banning both government and private use in public spaces. Boston, Minneapolis and New Orleans have since enacted their own prohibitions targeting police or municipal use, and Baltimore banned private use by most businesses in 2022. These local bans have been driven largely by community pressure rather than state or federal leadership, and they produce a patchwork: a resident’s exposure to biometric surveillance depends substantially on which city or agency they encounter.
Europe’s Stricter Baseline
The EU took a different path. Key prohibitions under the EU AI Act became applicable on February 2, 2025, banning the untargeted scraping of facial images from the internet or CCTV footage to build recognition databases, and imposing strict limits on real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement. Narrow exceptions exist, covering scenarios such as preventing a specific imminent terrorist threat or locating a missing child, but the default position is prohibition. That baseline diverges sharply from the current US picture, where federal deployment continues to expand and no statute governs data collection, storage or sharing.
Rights, Evidence and the Surveillance Argument
Across every jurisdiction where bans have been proposed or enacted, the legislative rationale converges on three points. The technology’s accuracy disparities fall most heavily on marginalised communities, undermining trust in public institutions. The capacity for mass surveillance erodes the practical anonymity that free expression and assembly depend on. And critics note there is no clear body of evidence that facial recognition produces meaningful reductions in crime sufficient to justify those trade-offs. The irreversibility of biometric data sharpens the concern: unlike a password, a face cannot be changed after a breach.
The gap between the moratorium bill and current federal practice is considerable. CBP is expanding its programme while the legislation sits in Congress, and no federal framework currently governs how agencies store, share or retain the biometric data they collect. The Moratorium Act’s path beyond reintroduction is uncertain, but the broader congressional debate over AI governance gives its sponsors a forum, and two wrongful arrest suits filed in a single year give them concrete evidence.



